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FROM THE RIGHT TO ECONOMIC SELF-DETERMINATION TO THE RIGHT
TO DEVELOPMENT: A CRISIS IN LEGAL THEORY.
Anthony Carty
Various formulations of the right of peoples to pursue their economic
development, whether they are found in the U.N. Human Rights Covenants,
the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of Friendly Relations among
States,1 or the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, to
mention only three, present a common theme; a virtually obsessive
repetition of the right of economic self-determination.2 The right is
seen as affording a framework for the struggle of developing countries to
attain the economic independence which has not followed automatically
upon the attainment of political independence. The survival of a legal
concept must depend upon its usefulness as an analytical-critical
instrument. Now it appears that, in practice, particularly at the United
Nations, the claim which states make to a right to economic
self-determination serves primarily as an ideological representation.
Alongside the opposing 'Western' claims for the principle of acquired
rights and for 'pacta sunt servanda', it expresses a real economic
contradiction and serves as a banner to mobilize developing countries in
the context of a North-South confrontation. Yet such an ideological use
of apparently legal concepts does not permit them to function as positive
rules of law.3
In my view the reduction of basic legal concepts to a purely
ideological role is an indication of a crisis in legal theory which goes
beyond the normal manipulation of law in diplomatic relations. The
concept of economic self-determination has its roots in a Western
tradition of legal voluntarism which cannot open the way out to either
national or international economic or social transformation. It restates
the basic Western concept of 'subjective right' and applies it to the
state. In such a view of a legal order, the basic structure of law is
subject/property/contract. The legal order begins with its subjects,
proceeds to determine what they own, and delimits the circumstances in
which the legal subjects may dispose of their property.4 The
consequence is a language of state rights which restricts attention to-
the authority and power of the state, without reference either to the
nature of the international economy or to the needs and aspirations of
peoples.5. This is because the right supposes a purely formal
perspective which reaches such a level of abstraction as to have no
contact with material reality. The language of law and the language of
the state are one and the same. However, much state organisation may
constitute an irreplacable framework for economic development, the fact
remains that juridical language is unable to present an independent
criticism of its performance.
One illustration of the nature of this process of abstraction may be
afforded by some of the discussion of the alleged responsibility of
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developed states for the historical consequences of colonialism. Article
16 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States refers to the
duty to compensate for the economic consequences of colonialism. Benedek
has pointed out6 that there is serious difficulty in giving any
formulation to a right to compensation, especially within the context of
the new claim to a right to development. The reason is simply that it is
difficult to relate the responsibility of particular colonial states to
their victims in a measurable way which takes account of the fact that
the existing world economic system adversely affects many developing
countries which were never colonized. The language of the subjective
rights of states is inadequate. This tendency of law to abtract itself
from history is also noted by Benchikh. The historical dimension of
colonialism has, in his view, created a relationship of dependence on the
part of developing countries towards developed countries, which is not
properly taken into account in present aid and 'industry-sharing'
policies towards developing countries. Because the constraining
consequences of colonial history are ignored, resort is had simply to the
language of solidarity among legally equal states. Regard is merely had
to their present formal capacity, with7oerhaps an exhortation to moral
solidarity thrown in for good measure. A formalist, a-historical
approach to law means, in turn, that new states are supposed to be
granted a legal capacity which takes no account of the actual extent of
their economic independence or the closely related issue of their social
and cultural cohesion. Indeed the argument is well known, particularly
in the context of Latin American studies, that legal independence is
supposed to be nothing more than a breakdown of European mercantilism and
a preparation, or sine qua non, for the integration of new states into a
liberal world economic order.8
Is it the failure of such a concept as the right of economic
self-determination to open the way out to either national or
international economic social and economic transformation which has led
developing countries such as Algeria to slip almost imperceptibly from
such legal discourse into the admittedly utterly vague language of the
right to development.9  It is, in any case, precisely because of the
banal fact that developing countries enjoy very little economic and-
social cohesion, that the whole problem of development arises? It would
be foolish to suppose that the debate in the United Nations on the legal
right to development has given rise to any consensus of viewpoint.
However the 1982 and 1983 reports of the Working Group of Governmental
Experts on the Right to Development provide numerous indications of a
felt need to break out of the bounds of a formal international legal
order. For instance, in considering means to realize the right to
development, the call is made, at the national level, for the
participation of everyone in the process of decision-making, itself with
a view to permitting equitable distribution of resources resulting from
developmentlO and, at the international level, for a means to ensure a
just and equitable division of labour, an adequate industrialization of
developing countries and a proper indexing of prices of exports and
imports from developirg countries.11
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.The debate about the right to development marks a crisis in legal
theory, because it encompasses a determined attempt to place material
content before form and yet retain whatever advantages are supposed to
attach to the use of legal language. Alston writes that "... the basic
content of the right to development is the need for justice ... "12 He
criticizes the 1979 Report by the U.N. Secretary-General on the Right to
Development, because "... it places ethical considerations before
relevant legal norms, although it fails to elaborate upon the link
between the two themes .,,"l As he himself appears to suggest, this
debate may be seen in the wider context of a recent tendency for U.N.
'discussion' (hardly action) in the field of human rights to move into a
structural phase. So it is recognized "...that it is at least as
important to identify and seek to remove the structural obstacles that
lie at the root of many an injustice as it is to deal with their symptoms
in the form of particular violations..." 1 4
The formal approach to law has at least two basic elements,
consensualism and the concept of subjective right. The task of the
jurist is seen as confined to tracing the course of each. This can be
observed in some Western academic treatment of the issue of a right to
development. For instance Israel draws attention to the imprecision of
the right. It is supposed to be necessarily fluid. The expression of
the right corresponds more to the affirmation of a principle than to the
recognition of a 'true subjective' right. At present one can only
outline its possible content by reference to the ideology of development
and to the claims of developing countries. 15 The basic difficulty is
whether, in this context of a crisis of development, one can hopefully or
usefully speak of particular developed states as having legal duties to
perform towards particular developing states. The theory of subjective
rights supposes that duties are undertaken voluntarily or as a result of
specific failures of conduct such as negligence or fraud. The
incongruity of this perspective is that Western jurists do accept the
existence of the right, in accordance with the usual consensual criteria
for the creation of positive law, and yet it appears that the right has
no definite content. Benedek points out how the juridical
conceptualization of the right to development does not mean that out of
it arises concrete legal claims, but rather that one has reached a
somehow juridical grasp of the question oe development. The right, as a
general principle of international law, is an abstraction of a general
consensus of states at an international level.16
A first step away from this legal formalism is to appreciate its
purely optional nature. That is to say, one might just as well not adopt
it. By way of illustration one might consider Weil's recent defence of
legal formalism. He opposes as condemned to subjectivism any Juridical
approach to a material concept of a law of international order. In the
absence of international. organs each state will give the interpretation
it pleases to such a concept.17 This is perfectly true. Yet it is
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simply a non-sequitur to argue, as Well does, 1 8 from the absence of an
institutionalized international community to an insistence upon the
priority of a voluntarist, contractual law. He supposes that his own
concept of law as a coordination of the wills of equal legal subjects19
is somehow neutral, the true starting point, rather than merely a
"perspective which is itself optional and relative. It is another French
jurist, Villey, who highlights the sense in which Well's perspective is
optional. The latter belongs to a legal tradition which goes back to the
European Renaissance, to Occam and Hobbes, which simply chooses to take
the individual as a starting point, rather than seeing him as a part of a
wider social body. 2 0 The fact/law distinction upon which the
formalists so strongly Insist (perhaps as well expressed by the so-called
is/ought dichotomy) is nothing more than a preference of a particular
tradition to begin with the will of the individual subject, rather than
with his social context. Those who prefer to accept that it is the
latter which contains at least the outlines of the imperatives which ajurist has to recognize may simply take a different course from Well's.
So much of the language used in the development and new international
economic order debate does point in this direction. For instance,
Cristescu appears to believe that an imperative comes out of the very
fact that '...countries possessing raw materials should be paid for them
at prices commensurate with the work which goes into the exploitation of
these raw materials and with their economic and social value... 21
It is too much to attribute profound philosophical undertones to the
United Nations debate on the right to development. A survey of the
summary records of the 39th session of the Human Rights Commission in
Geneva22 reveals a fairly repetitive reassertion of basic platitudes
which are set out in Article (3) of the Technical Consolidation (of
texts) of 20th June 1983, an explosion of laudable phrases unrelated to
one another. It is possible to find stimulating references to new
avenues of approach. The Colombian delegate insisted that development
was a right of peoples, not of states, that economic growth had to
harmonize with nature and that resistance had to be made to dehumanizing
production processes. The Irish delegate said that the crisis of
International law could only be overcome if it became a law of
cooperation, in which case one would inevitably have new conceptual
problems in searcing for criteria to define relationships of assistance
and solidarity.24 However, such remarks have to be seen alongside
numerous other reiterations of entrenched positions, liberal and marxist,
both of which place the state at the centre of human rights issues,
whether as promotor or as antagonist. The priority given to the state
was clearly the intention of the drafters of the right to
self-determination of states in the U.N. Human Rights Covenants.25 The
Technical rcnsolidation repeats, in its Article 3(2), that states have
the primary responsibility to ensure development, both within their
territory and internationally.
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Nonetheless, it is clear that the issue of participation has become
central to the Human Rights Commission discussions and its resolution
1983/14 requests the Secretary-General to undertake a comprehensive
analytical study of popular participation. Special mention is made of
the Yugoslavia International Seminar on Popular Participation.26 Such
a reference at least allows one to treat as relevant the issues raised at
that seminar. For instance reference is made to the need to force the
oal of economic growth to give way to an intergrated package, which
ncludes popular participation as a means to the optimal utilization of
human creativity, including the dimension of ecological balance. In this
context, there was acceptance at the seminar, that state planning was a
complex, technical process which ran the danger of administrative
elitism, marginalizing democratic local activity. There was an accepted
need for new guidelines on popular participation which would question a
purely quantitative perspective towards development, measuring compliance
and quota systems of production, rather than the more intangible factors
just mentioned.
The Technical Consolidation of Texts does provide a framework to
elaborate on these ideas. For instance Article 10 says that states
should take appropriate action to provide a comprehensive framework for
popular participation in development, and Article 2, while accepting that
states have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate development
policies, nonetheless allows that human beings have the primary
responsibility themselves. States have, further, to respect the
intermediate associations which individuals form. It might be said that
any categorical insistence upon the integral place of human rights in any
development process (or upon the equal status of political, civil,
economic and social rights) is bound to lead to an abandonment of the
positivist tradition that the language of the law and the language of the
state are one and the same.
The apparent prominence given to the concept of participation in the
United Nations discussions of the right to development is merely a
reflection of a wider uncertainty, even in radical third world circles,
about a concept of economic self-determination which applies exclusively
to states. Once the right is supposed to belong exclusively to the
state, there is no way that it can be used to ensure either a critique of
that state's own internal economic and social structures, or an
identification of the nature of its ties of economic dependency. This is
simply because the state as such is merely a formal concept which denotes
a delimitation of competences, that is an arrangement or perhaps
organization of particular territories and populations within an
international legal order. In practice the traditional legal discourse
on economic sovereignty has come together with a third-world nationalist
ideology merely on the basis of a legal 'decisionism'. That is to say, a
nationalist ideology is supposed to ensure a certainty of choice by a
third-world state, which is not a reflection of any genuine certainty
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about the problem of economic development. A recent illustration of this
pattern may be seen in Article 9 of the Draft U.N. Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations. It is confined to reiterating that
transnational corporations must correspond to the host state' nationally
set goals and priorities. Yet how does a state define these. 7
A prominent Algerian jurist, Mahiou, a member of the International
Law Commission, says it is now obvious that only governing elites benefit
from the existing world economic system. Only a policy of total
mobilization of a country's internal resources towards auto-centred
development can break the dominance of Western economies and values. In
his view a direct connection has to be made between national and
international~oolitics, based upon an equitable and democratic order at
both levels.2d At the same time the 1983 World Development Report
subjects the state to an equally severe critique from a perhaps more
Western liberal perspective. Its main conclusion is that policy reform
is relevant only if there is the institutional capacity to carry it out.
The form of grand plans matters less than the substance of actions needed
to achieve central goals. The implied rejection of 'blue prints' in,
tackling the comlexities of development is accompanied by a stressing of
the importance of building into every strategy and programme an effective
learning process. At the field level this means officials looking
outward, to serve clients rather than inward, to satisfy predetermined
bureaucratic procedures.29 This language of 'managerese' evidences the
same institutional crisis as the radicalism of Mahiou.
It is remarkable how far the two approaches agree at an empirical
level about the scope of the problem. Benchihk characterizes
state-capitalist third world societies as emeshed in quasi-feudal
bureaucratic conflicts, unable to launch an all-embracing programme cf
economic and social self-reliance, in a context in which they are out of
touch with their populations.30 The World Development Report
identifies the problem of overstaffed bureaucracies, remote from the
public they serve and not subject to effective external pressures within
their societies, which frequently lack independent public opinion or
opposition. Global reform from within these institutions is virtually
inconceivable, given the vested interests involved, and the complexities
of problems linked naturally to patterns of rapid economic and social
change. 31
Disagreement emerges, of course, at the level of analysis and
explanation. The central relevance of the conflicting approaches, for
the issue of a right of participation, is the insistence by dependency
theory, that the basic feature of world capitalism is a transnational
integration which is accompanied by national disintegration. The most
important features of this process are identified by Snyder as the
increasing marginalization of the mass of the population from a
reasonable income and the disintegration of national social classes.32
Within this framework, Genchikh objects to third world demands for a new
international economic oider which are no more than state capitalist
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demands for a greater quantitative share in industrial production without
a change in the quality of an international division of labour, leaving
decisive technological leadership in the West. Placing all authority in
the state they may manage some measure of sectoral growth to increase the
scope of exercise of state sovereignty. Yet, cut off from a proletariat
which they distrust, with an absence of popular participation, they
cannot imagine or fully express the right of self-determination of
peoples. Benchikh traces this pattern of fragmentation to the detail of,
for instance, technology transfer, where state officials prefer
international contracts and Western assistance, introducing developed
country patterns of production, instead of engaging in dialogue with
workers, in a context in which both sections of society have been
retarded by the history of colonialism.33
The World Development Report subscribes fully to what Snyder
characterizes as the ideology of developmentism, which supposes that
knowledge (expertise) is cumulative and that experimentation and
experience will yield objective procedures for the achievement of
material development, especially of basic needs.34 The Report
considers the option of decentralization understood as devolution of
political power, deconcentration of central government on a purely
geographical basis, and delegation of government authority to public
bodies, particularly state corporations. However its general conclusion
is that decentralization has to be seen as not much more than the
incremental building up of the capacity of organizations to assume
greater responsibilities. It cannot of itself compensate for a general
shortage of technical, administrative skills. The main thrust of the
solution is to have fewer, better (paid) officials, controlling only what
needs to be controlled. The latter objective could be achieved through a
reduction in the level of state control, e.g. in the area of regulation
of trade, and in the delegation of economic powers to public bodies more
amenable to the market. Government needs to retain central control of
budget and foreign debt so that perhaps the best scope for
decentralization/participation is in such matters as delivery of rural
and social services and dividing up tasks for rural managers.35
Hence it appears that the language of a right to development,
particularly with its emphasis on popular participation is very relevant
to the politically radical, dependency analysis of international society,
while fairly marginal to the modernization approach of the World Bank.
Yet it can hardly be said that mere repetition of the concept of
participation provides a serious answer to the crisis of third world
civilization which Western modernization is causing. Benchikh proposes a
societal introversion, based upon a more profound integration of the
agricultural and industrial sectors of society, with a maximum local
intermeshing and satisfaction of basic needs. b Yet a main thrust of
his analysis is the inextricable linkage between developed and developing
countries. He accepts that it is impossible to expect the former to
integrate the social-cultural world of the latter into the shaping of
their educational and scientific policies.37 Indeed he believes it is
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precisely the Third World demand for the international diffusion of
scientific knowledge which will eventually necessitate, through internal
education, a democracy 'at home' in developing countries.38 In other
words the depth of global intercultural penetration is beyond the grasp
of either of the main North-South divides and it is hardly even possible
to disentangle its positive and negative causes, however identifiable may
be some of its end effects. While dependency theorists such as Snyder
may wish to see research oriented towards how third world societies
became integrated into the world capitalist system, he admits that, the
causes of this original imbalance, going back in Wallerstein's view to
the 16th Century,39 are very much in dispute. It is by no means clear
what economic anthropology, whether marxist or oth rwise, can contribute
in the way of social and cultural reconstruction.4u So perhaps it
might .be better to consider approaches to law and the right to
development, which assume that the crisis, from which developing
countries appear to suffer most acutely, is common to both North and
South. This crisis may have its roots in the culture which first
separated the two, that of Renaissance Europe, a culture which has now
come to a turning point.
It is, in my view, arguable that the vacuity of the legal language of
the right to development is attributable not to the concept of
development itself, but to the nature of the Western concept of law. The
latter is merely a part of a culture which supposes nature to be
infinitely malleable and man to be capable of perpetually redefining
himself. In this respect there is no significant difference between
liberal and marxist perspectives on law. The starting point of all law
is to suppose that the individual subject is outside any 'binding
framework'. That is to say, individual freedom is not granted by any
outside order. So legal obligation represents a consensual renounciation
of a part of one's otherwise unlimited freedom.41 It does not matter
whether the individual is a single person, a prince, the state or God.
The essence of law is the purely formal delimitation of competences, or
areas of jurisdiction, conceived of, at least at the end of the Middle
ages when this view of law first arose, as a hierarchical delegation of
powers. At least this is Villey's account of the process.42 Law does
not have any 'necessary' material substance because the individual,
however defined, does not exist in any 'necessary' social or natural,
physical or biological, relationship to a world outside himself.
Arendt in her classical study, The Human Condition, asserts that the
key form of Western alienation is not from the self, as Marx supposed,
but from the world. It has its roots in a philosophy of physics which
goes back to the early Renaissance. As is well known, Galileo's
astrophysical world view presented a very serious challerge to the
adequacy of the senses to reveal reality, indeed leaving us '...in a
universe of whose qualities we know no more than the way they affect our
measurirg instruments...' 43. This loss of the scientific self-evidence
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of appearances affected all branches of knowledge at their common root,
the traditional assumption that '...what truly is will appear of its own
accord and that human capabilities are adequate to receive it..." 44.
The Cartesian way to return to certainty was to dissolve all 'real'
relationships into logical relations between man-made symbols. In other
words, Descartes reduces all experience, with the world as well as with
-other human beings, to experience between man and himself.45 However,
in Arendt's view, the conviction that objective truth is not given to
man, so that he can only know what he makes himself, breaks down, once it
is applied to political theory. '...The idea that only what I am going
to make will be real...is forever defeated by the actual course of
events, where nothing happens more frequently than the totally
unexpected...'. 46 It simplifies the history of ideas that both Villey
and Arendt treat Hobbes as the key figure in the introduction of the new
'scientific' concepts into political philosophy. Since the intervention
of Hobbes, all legal, and of course political, obligation has had to be
traced back to the only possible 'self-evident' source of such
obligation, the fact of a social contract or compact. One may vary the
subjects of the compact, or the measure of consent which must really be
present, but no obligation may exist which is not derived from a
man-made, and for this reason only, self-evident starting point.
There is at least one perspective on the crisis of developing
countries for which Arendt's history of the philosophy of science is not
at all remote. In his now famous study, La Pauvrete, Richesse des
Peuples, Tevoedjre takes as a basic theme the abstraction of man from
society and nature. He objects, above all, to a pattern of deductive,
logical thinking, whereby those in the third world choose premises of
reasoning outside of their societies, which then trap them into a series
of inevitable consequences. They should, instead, employ a process of
induction, beginning from the realities of their own societies, and based
not on a hypothesis of a will to power, but on a 'good organization' of
the life of human groups.47 Tevo&djr 's vision of an economy, based as
far as possible on the principle of production of goods for direct use
rather than exchange, is not a nostalgic appeal to dying social
structures. He insists that the social reality, into which a new
technology of production must be integrated, is one which encompasses the
richness of a biological relationship between man and the natural
elements, the richness of a feeling of belonging to a territory, of a
consciousness of being part of a human and social universe.
This is the context in which Tevo~djre rejects the foundations of an
industrial capitalism which leads to such a specialization and
centralization of knowledge and production, that the ideal of
self-sufficient and locally responsible communities becomes a remote
dream.48 It can hardly be said that he sets out to provide the detail
of the vision which Arendt clearly considers necessary, but there seems
no doubt that he believes that the crisis of development must include the
dimension of philosoohical-scientific inquiry. Despecialization and
decentralization of knowledge and production can only come as part oF an
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assault on the authority accorded by Western culture to an abstract mode
of thinking which is ostensibly indeterminate as to its starting point
and which does not allow for any integrating framework.
So however uncongenial it may be for his professional self-assurance,
the lawyer has to ask whether contemporary philosophy of science affords
any support for a perspective such as Tevodjri's. One possible approach
is suggested by the so-called systems view of life. Its basic principle
appears very attractive to the debate on the right to development. It is
supposed that every living organism is self-organizing in that its
structure and function are not imposed by the environment, but are
established by the system itself. At the same time, living organisms
interact continuously with their environment. The systemic dimension of
this biological theory is that each living organism is seen as a
subsystem which, although relatively autonomous, is also a component of a
larger organism, which is, finally, the eco-system of the entire
planet.49 In this perspective the individual is not supposed to be an
isolated self, but should become aware of himself as an inseparable part
of.the 'cosmos' in which he is embedded. The systems view of life
opposes the mechanical, supposedly Neutonian view of reality, as
dominated by a linear process of cause and effect into which the isolated
individual as an observer may assert his will with what Capra calls a
cyclical pattern of events, known as a feed-back loop.51 The
properties of the total system cannot be predicted from the sum of their
parts. Every one of its tissues is linked to every other one and they
are all mutually interdependent.5z The conclusion is the first
political principle of ecology that man is part of a world which is an
organic whole. He has first to understand himself as one organism in
this whole, not merely supposing himself to be infinitely redefinable and
the world infinitely malleable.
By way of conclusion it might not be without interest to look briefly
at the contrast which Villey draws between pre and post-Renaissance
European legal theory. He insists that the essential feature of the
earlier tradition is that it did not take the individual as the starting
point of juristic inquiry. Certainly consent is part of any system of
law, but it has to be seen as no more than a part, just as the individual
is no more than a part of the social whole. The concept of obligation
may be central to morality, but it is only an aspect of law.53 Drawing
on an interpretation of Aristotle and of the Roman law juristic
tradition, Villey claims that concepts of equity and justice must not be
seen merely as moral qualities of persons, for instance to evaluate the
quality of their actions (of will) in themselves, but rather as a measure
or proportion applied to persons in their concrete social circumstances.
In this perspective, the social world is not an inert material facticity,
awaiting analysis. It has to be interpreted as a matter of what is a
more or less complete representation of an idea or of a 'form' (e.g. the
'form' of a man is not simply the aging man or the child at play, but the
adult reaching the summit of his 'development'). The task of the jurist
is to discern these forms. Legislation may give them a more definite
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general shape and the judge may adapt them to concrete circumstances.
However it always remains the task of the jurist to indicate solutions
based upon the widest use of dialectic, confrontation of opinion, and
attention to concrete circumstance. 54
None of .the argument of the present section can claim the rigour of
*the method of any particular discipline, least of all that of the history
of ideas. However, in my view, there is a prima facie case that there is
more to-the crisis of legal theory relating to the right to development,
than the impatience of developing countrynlawyers. Furthermore it
appears that the crisis is not simply, as is virtually universally
supposed, a political one. There is plenty of evidence that it goes to
the root of Western culture. In this context it may well be an
indication of hope that pre-modern Western legal culture was, possibly,
more in tune with certain modern philosophical/scientific theories of the
world, than is more dominant contemporary legal theory.
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